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Abstract
There is currently a strong focus worldwide on the potential of large-scale Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems
to cut costs and improve patient outcomes through increased efficiency. This is accomplished by aggregating medical
data from isolated Electronic Medical Record databases maintained by different healthcare providers. Concerns about
the privacy and reliability of Electronic Health Records are crucial to healthcare service consumers. Traditional security
mechanisms are designed to satisfy confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements, but they fail to provide
a measurement tool for data reliability from a data entry perspective. In this paper, we introduce a Medical Data
Reliability Assessment (MDRA) service model to assess the reliability of medical data by evaluating the trustworthiness
of its sources, usually the healthcare provider which created the data and the medical practitioner who diagnosed the
patient and authorised entry of this data into the patient’s medical record. The result is then expressed by manipulating
health record metadata to alert medical practitioners relying on the information to possible reliability problems.
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1 Introduction
The healthcare domain stands to gain enormously from the increased adoption of Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT). Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems are the latest evolution of healthcare ICT, and countries
such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the USA are working on plans for national EHR systems [3].
An Electronic Health Record is defined by Iakovidis [4] as “digitally stored healthcare information about an individual’s
lifetime with the purpose of supporting continuity of care, education and research, and ensuring confidentiality at all
times”. It is a mechanism for integrating healthcare information currently collected in both paper files and Electronic
Medical Record (EMR) databases by a variety of healthcare providers [17]. Electronic Health Records (EHRs) enable
the efficient communication of medical information, and thus reduce costs and administrative overheads [3, 1]. Further-
more, they aim to provide authorised healthcare professionals with legitimate access to a wealth of historical medical
data at one access point.
However, to achieve these potential benefits, the healthcare industry needs to overcome several significant obstacles, in
particular having confidence in the reliability of the EHRs’ medical data. Concern about data reliability is a crucial factor
that may have a strong effect on how medical practitioners use EHRs [4]. This issue arises because the EHR’s medical
data is composed from different healthcare providers’ Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems and from paper-based
medical reports and referrals that patients received from those healthcare providers who do not have an EMR system
or an electronic connection to the EHR system. By using the EHR system, a medical practitioner will be exposed to
historical medical data with varying levels of reliability; the data might originate from a healthcare provider that does
not satisfy patient safety requirements, e.g. is known to habitually enter inaccurate or incomplete data, or be entered
by a medical practitioner who fails to satisfy medical safety practices, e.g. is known to violate medical procedures. As a
consequence, the reliability of the EHR medical data depends on the trustworthiness of the source and the creator of
the captured data. However, in medical practice medical data is usually assumed reliable a priori so, in the absence of
a reliability evaluation technique, all data will be valued equally. In the following scenario we demonstrate the harmful
impact that may occur if a measure of medical data reliability is not incorporated in the EHR system.
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Patient ‘Sara’ from Sydney notices a mole on her back and goes to her General Practitioner ‘Tony’ who
diagnoses the case, informs her that it is not a skin cancer, and performs a small surgery to remove it.
Three months later, Sara gets a new job and moves to Cairns. Sara becomes ill and starts losing weight.
She visits her new GP ‘Frank’ who, thanks to the EHR system, looks into her medical history. Seeing
nothing relevant in her EHR, he diagnoses the case as depression and prescribes anti-depressants. Six
months later, Sara’s health gets worse and her GP Frank requests some pathology tests which reveal that
Sara has a skin cancer, which has now advanced to a life-threatening state. Frank looks again into Sara’s
EHR, and specifically the diagnosis made by Tony, and concludes that Tony’s diagnosis was not correct.
Frank also finds that Tony has had many medical misdiagnosis cases lodged against him in the past two
years.
If the EHR system was equipped with a mechanism to evaluate the EHR data’s reliability, Frank would have been alerted
to Tony’s potentially unreliable diagnosis each time he accessed Sara’s EHR, allowing him to detect the cancer earlier.
However, current EHR network models (e.g. the Centralised health information model and the Health record data bank
model) [19] fail to alert medical practitioners to possible reliability problems with medical data. Therefore, we need a
mechanism to alert medical practitioners about possibly unreliable data fields in an Electronic Health Record. This
does not imply that such fields should be deleted from the patient’s EHR, however. Instead, they should be retained but
marked, via appropriate metadata, to indicate their low levels of reliability. Such a reliability evaluation will allow medical
practitioners to treat potentially unreliable data with caution, and either test it independently, or check for corroborating
evidence in other EHR fields.
In this paper, we propose a Medical Data Reliability Assessment (MDRA) model for validating the reliability of medical
data used to construct Electronic Health Records. This is achieved by using metadata to extract information about
the medical data’s sources (e.g. healthcare providers and medical practitioners). This information is then used in a
statistical process to derive a total reliability measure for each EHR data field. The resulting reliability estimate can be
expressed in the EHR presented to a medical practitioner to indicate a reliability problem if one exists.
2 Related Work
Reputation systems represent an important input for assessing the trust (or reliability) of a certain agent or service.
These systems provide a reputation score for an agent calculated from the agent’s ratings as voted on by others who
have experienced a transaction with the agent. For instance, eBay’s (www.ebay.com) feedback forum is one of the ear-
liest reputation systems; it collects buyers’ feedback (either +1, 0, or −1) and aggregates them equally [16] to produce
a global reputation score for the seller. The global score is further processed to provide the percentage of positive
feedback that is gained by the seller. However, this additive scheme ignores the personalised nature of reputation
measures [15]. A slightly better approach, the average reputation scheme [18] provides an improved calculation be-
cause it computes the reputation score as the average of all ratings. This principle is used in the reputation systems of
many commercial web sites, such as Revolution Health (www.revolutionhealth.com) and Amazon (www.amazon.com).
Although the average reputation scheme is better than the additive scheme, it still has the same weaknesses.
In the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) research arena, many reputation models have been proposed to assist in assigning reputation
scores to those agents within the P2P network. These scores help an agent (service seeker) to make its own decision
to trust and connect to the most honest and reliable agents (service providers). EigenTrust [14] is a reputation-based
trust management system that aims to minimise malicious behavior in a peer-to-peer network. It computes the agents’
trust scores through repeated and iterative multiplication and aggregation of trust scores along transitive chains until
the trust scores for all agent members of the P2P community converge to stable values. PeerTrust [22, 23] is another
reputation-based trust management system for P2P eCommerce communities. It is even more cautious and examines
the received ratings for their quality. It uses five factors to do so, namely feedback in terms of the amount of satisfaction,
the number of transactions, the transaction’s context factor, and the community context factor. These factors are used
to discount the agent’s trust value. However, our work differs from these two models in two aspects. Firstly, in the
healthcare context, it’s crucial to have on hand the identity of the agent who created the medical data (i.e. the healthcare
provider or medical practitioner) in order to ensure accountability. In this way, the healthcare context differs significantly
from the P2P context. Secondly, in our MDRA model we follow a sounder mathematical basis by using beta and
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dirichlet probability density functions for combining feedback and for expressing reputation ratings, and subjective logic
to represent the trust value where we consider agent’s uncertainty factor.
A Bayesian approach is used in more sophisticated reputation systems [20, 21] to produce the reputation score. For
example, Wang et al. [15] proposed a reputation model that uses beta probability functions to represent the distribution
of trust values according to an interaction history. This model calculates trust either by considering direct observations,
if any, or by taking the recommendation of neighbouring agents. However, this model does not distinguish between two
trust aspects in its calculation, namely functional trust and referral trust [10], in which case functional trust values are
assigned to neighbors in calculating the transitive trust on a specific agent, while the referral trust supports accurate
calculation. TRAVOS [20] is another system that uses the Bayesian approach to calculate a reputation score from
binomial ratings and it considers referral trust in its transitive trust calculation. However, in the absence of any evidence,
the TRAVOS system will assign an agent a default 0.5 reputation score that results from using the initial settings for
the Bayesian parameters α and β . This system does not consider other factors that will have an impact on the default
reputation score for these new agents. By contrast, our Medical Data Reliability Assessment model employs a dynamic
community base rate that is the average reputation score of the whole community that the agent belongs to. This
dynamic community base rate is used in evaluating the reputation of any known or unknown agent, which improves
the reliability estimation process since the community base rate dynamically reflects the trustworthiness of the whole
community at any one time.
Even more relevant to our research is Hedaquin [2], a system for measuring the quality of health data that is entered into
a patient’s health record. Hedaquin is based on a Beta reputation system and uses the credentials of the health data
supplier, ratings for the health data supplier, and metadata supplied by measuring devices as measures. Hedaquin’s
goal is similar to our Medical Data Reliability Assessment (MDRA) model, but instead of assessing the quality of the
raw health data, our MDRA model assesses the trustworthiness of the medical data as entered into the patient’s
Electronic Health Record (EHR). Hedaquin uses some ad hoc factors to discount the final quality value and does not
provide an accurate trustworthiness estimate of new agents because it follows the same approach as TRAVOS. By
contrast, the approach for assessing data reliability in our MDRA model uses two reputation systems, namely Beta
and Dirichlet, which accepts binomial and multinomial ratings and makes the MDRA model capable of expanding and
accepting ratings from various trusted agents. In addition, the MDRA model assesses new agents by considering their
surrounding community’s trustworthiness.
3 Trust and Reputation Systems
Reputation systems collect ratings about users or service providers from members of a community. The reputation
system is then able to compute and publish reputation scores about those users and services. Reputation systems use
different rating levels, which might be binomial or multinomial. These reputation scores are used to assist in measuring
or evaluating the trust or reliability of a certain agent.
In this section, we review the reputation systems that are used in our model, namely Beta and Dirichlet reputation
systems, and the Subjective Logic trust model we employ.
3.1 Beta Reputation System
Binomial reputation systems are based on a beta probability function [5], which can be used to represent the probability
distribution of binary events, and are therefore called Beta reputation systems. In a reputation calculation process, the
Beta reputation system updates its two parameters α and β (Eq. 1) with the recorded observations about a certain
agent, to adjust its statistical beta Probability Density Function (PDF). These observations are classified as either
positive, r, or negative, s, observations. The α and β parameters can be computed as functions of r and s according
to Eq. 1 below,
α = r+Wa, β = s+W (1−a) , (1)
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where a expresses the base rate, and W is the weight of the non-informative prior, and normally W = 2. The a posteriori
reputation score is computed as the expected probability, E(p), as defined by:
E(p) =
α
α +β
. (2)
As an example, let an agent A have 8 positive and 2 negative observations about agent B. Further assume that the
base rate a is set to be 0.5. By using Eqs. 1 and 2, the probability expectation value is equal to 0.8. This can be
interpreted as saying that the relative frequency of a positive observation in the future is somewhat uncertain, and that
the most likely value is 0.8.
3.2 Dirichlet Reputation System
Multinomial Bayesian systems are based on computing reputation scores by statistical updating of Dirichlet Probability
Density Functions (PDF), which therefore are called Dirichlet reputation systems [12, 13]. The a posteriori (i.e. the
updated) reputation score is computed by combining the a priori (i.e. previous) reputation score with new ratings.
In Dirichlet reputation systems agents are allowed to rate other agents or services with any value from a set of pre-
defined rating levels, and the reputation scores are not static but will gradually change with time as a function of the
received ratings. Initially, each agent’s reputation is defined by the base rate reputation. After ratings about a particular
agent have been received, that agent’s reputation will change accordingly.
Let there be k different discrete rating levels L. This translates into having a state space of cardinality k for the Dirichlet
distribution. Let the rating level be indexed by i. The aggregate ratings for a particular agent are stored as a cumulative
vector, expressed as:
~R = (~R(Li) | i = 1 . . .k) . (3)
This vector can be computed recursively and can take factors such as longevity and the community base rate into
account [12]. The most direct way of representing a reputation score for an agent y is to simply aggregate the rating
vector ~Ry which represents all relevant previous ratings. The aggregate rating of a particular level i for agent y is denoted
by ~Ry(Li).
For visualisation of reputation scores, the most natural approach is to define the reputation score as a function of the
probability expectation values of each rating level. Before any ratings about a particular agent y have been received, its
reputation is defined by the common base rate vector~a. As ratings about a particular agent are collected, the aggregate
ratings can be computed recursively [12, 13] and the derived reputation scores will change accordingly. Let ~R represent
a target agent’s aggregate ratings. Then the vector ~S, defined by
~Sy :
(
~Sy(Li) =
~Ry(Li)+W~a(Li)
W +∑kj=1~Ry(L j)
; | i = 1 . . .k
)
, (4)
is the corresponding multinomial probability reputation score. Parameter W represents the non-informative prior weight,
where W = 2 is usually the value of choice, but larger values for constant W can be chosen if a reduced influence of
new evidence over the base rate is required.
The reputation score ~S can be interpreted like a multinomial probability measure as an indication of how a particular
agent is expected to behave in future transactions. It can easily be verified that
k
∑
i=1
~S(Li) = 1 . (5)
While informative, the multinomial probability representation can require considerable space on a computer screen
because multiple values must be visualised. A more compact form can be used to express the reputation score as a
4
single value in some predefined interval. This can be done by assigning a point value ν to each rating level Li, and
computing the normalised weighted point estimate score ε .
Assume, for example, that there are k different rating levels with point values ν(Li) evenly distributed in the range [0,1]
according to ν(Li) = i−1k−1 . The point estimate reputation score of a reputation ~R is then:
ε =
k
∑
i=1
ν(Li)~S(Li) . (6)
Such a point estimate in the interval [0,1] can be scaled to any range, such as 1–5 stars, a percentage or a probability.
Bootstrapping a reputation system to a stable and conservative state is important. In the framework described above,
the base rate distribution ~a will define the initial default reputation for all agents. The base rate can, for example, be
evenly distributed over all rating levels, or biased towards either negative or positive rating levels. This must be defined
when setting up the reputation system in a specific community.
As an example, consider a rating scale with five levels:
L1: Bad
L2: Mediocre
L3: Average
L4: Good
L5: Excellent
We assume a default base rate distribution a = 0.2. Before any ratings have been received, the multinomial probability
reputation score will be represented as in Figure 1(a).
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5
(a) Base rate probability expectation values
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5
(b) Updated probability expectation values
Figure 1: Example multinomial probability expectation
Now assume that 10 ratings are received, where 5 are bad, and 5 are excellent. This translates into the multinomial
probability reputation score of Figure 1(b). The point estimate reputation score is calculated by using Eq. 6, and
equals 0.5.
3.3 Subjective Logic
Subjective logic [6, 7, 9] is a type of probabilistic logic that explicitly takes uncertainty and belief ownership into account.
Arguments in subjective logic are subjective opinions about states in a state space. A binomial opinion applies to
a single proposition, and can be represented as a Beta distribution. A multinomial opinion applies to a collection of
propositions, and can be represented as a Dirichlet distribution.
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Subjective logic defines a trust metric called opinion denoted by ωAX = (~b,u,~a), which expresses the relying party A’s
belief over a state space X . Here~b represents a belief mass vector over the states of X , and u represents an uncertainty
mass where~b,u ∈ [0,1] and ∑~b+u = 1. Vector~a ∈ [0,1] represents the base rates over X , and is used for computing
the probability expectation value of a state x as
E(x) =~b(x)+~a(x)u , (7)
meaning that ~a determines how uncertainty contributes to E(x). Binomial opinions are expressed as ωAx = (b,d,u,a)
where d denotes disbelief in statement x. For instance, given the statement x : “David is honest and reliable”, then the
opinion can be interpreted as evaluation trust in David. More specifically, the trust target is David, and the trust scope
is σ : “To be honest and reliable”, so that x ≡ D(σ). The opinion can be denoted with explicit attributes as ωAD(σ), but
the trust scope can be omitted when it is obvious.
As an example, assume that Alice needs treatment for her knee and asks her GP Bob to recommend a good physio-
therapist. When Bob recommends David, Alice would like to get a second opinion, so she asks Claire for her opinion
about David. The trust scope in this case can be expressed as σ : “To be a competent physiotherapist”. This situation
is illustrated in Figure 2 where the indexes on arrows indicate the order in which the opinions are formed.
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Figure 2: Deriving trust from parallel transitive chains
When trust and referrals are expressed as subjective opinions, each transitive trust path Alice→Bob→David, and
Alice→Claire→David can be computed with the transitivity operator, also called the discounting operator, where the
idea is that the referrals from Bob and Claire are discounted as a function of Alice’s trust in Bob and Claire respectively.
Finally the two paths can be combined using the cumulative or averaging fusion operator. These operators form part
of Subjective Logic [7, 9], and semantic constraints must be satisfied in order for the transitive trust derivation to be
meaningful [8]. Opinions can be uniquely mapped to beta PDFs, and in this sense the fusion operator is equivalent to
Bayesian updating. This model is thus both belief-based and Bayesian.
Algebraically, a trust relationship between A and B is denoted [A,B], transitivity of two arcs is indicated using a binary “:”
operator, and the fusion of two parallel paths is indicated with a “¦” operator. The trust network of Figure 2 can then be
expressed as:
[A,D] = ([A,B] : [B,D])¦ ([A,C] : [C,D]) . (8)
The corresponding transitivity operator for opinions is denoted as “⊗” and the corresponding fusion operator as “⊕”.
The mathematical expression for combining the opinions about the trust relationships of Figure 2 is then:
ωAD = (ωAB ⊗ωBD)⊕ (ωAC ⊗ωCD) . (9)
4 Medical Data Reliability Network Structure
Figure 3 shows our proposed network structure for deriving a healthcare provider’s level of trust in Electronic Health
Record medical data fields, via our Medical Data Reliability Assessment model. In this section, we explain the function-
ality of each component. The protocol by which these components interact is described in Section 5.
6
Reputation Centre
Healthcare Authority
A B DHealthcareProvider MDRA 1
2
4
3
5
Information from legal public 
sources about healthcare agents
Information from legal public 
sources about healthcare agents
Ratings from the community
members
Ratings from the community
members
Figure 3: Medical Data Reliability Network Structure
4.1 Healthcare Authority (HA)
A Healthcare Authority is a legal body that records information (metadata) gathered from public sources including,
but not limited to, reports received from healthcare providers and medical practitioners about incorrect medical data
or procedures, and medical misconduct, non-safety, or malpractice cases. The subject of this information is either
a healthcare provider, a medical practitioner, or both. The HA uses this information to produce a ratings vector, in
which it ranks each reported case according to its severity. This process can be done by applying previously-defined
classification rules to each case.
In addition the HA assigns a base rate for each severity rating level and for the prior behavior of the healthcare agent
(either a healthcare provider or medical practitioner). The HA’s ratings vector will have k levels representing the severity
(danger) levels for reported cases. Here we assume that level 1 denotes the highest level of severity and level k−1 the
lowest. Level k denotes the special case of assumed ‘perfect’ behaviour, in the sense that there have been no adverse
reports.
From this, the HA provides authorised or registered healthcare providers with its opinion (arrow 2 in Figure 3) about
the medical conduct and practice of a certain healthcare provider or medical practitioner. Here, the HA acts as a
Dirichlet reputation system and expresses its trust using the Subjective Logic trust metric opinion. For example, ωHAA =
(~bHAA ,u
HA
A ,~a
HA
C ) is Healthcare Authority HA’s trust opinion about healthcare agent A. ~a
HA
C represents HA’s base rate
for A’s community (C).
In order to represent the Healthcare Authority’s opinion as a single value, it uses a point estimate representation. Due
to the fact that the rating levels are not evenly distributed, the HA should manually define point value vector ~m to express
its weight for each rating level. Therefore, the reputation score is computed as:
εHAX =
k
∑
i=1
~m(Li)~S(Li) . (10)
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4.2 Reputation Centre (RC)
A Reputation Centre receives ratings from community members (e.g. patients) about healthcare providers and medical
practitioners. These ratings are used by the reputation centre to derive a reputation score for those rated agents; this
reputation score represents the RC’s subjective opinion (arrow 4 in Figure 3). These opinions can be communicated to
healthcare providers. The RC acts as a Dirichlet reputation centre and expresses its opinions in the same way that the
Healthcare Authority HA does. For example, ωRCA = (~b
RC
A ,u
RC
A ,~a
RC
C ) is Reputation Centre RC’s opinion about healthcare
agent A.
4.3 Medical Data Reliability Agent (MDRA)
The Medical Data Reliability Agent is a service employed by the Electronic Health Record (EHR) system used by a
Healthcare Provider (HP) to measure the reliability of medical data sourced from other healthcare agents (e.g. health-
care providers or medical practitioners). The HP has a database that records the HP’s interaction experiences with
other healthcare agents. These experiences are created from the internal reports that are received from the HP’s med-
ical practitioners about those received external medical data. The HP uses this information to either record good or
bad experiences with the agents who created these data. The HP’s experiences are then used by the MDRA that acts
as a Beta reputation system to compute the HP’s opinion about a certain healthcare agent. Healthcare provider HP’s
opinion about a healthcare agent A (arrow 1 in Figure 3) is denoted as ωHP?A = (bHP
?
A ,d
HP?
A ,u
HP?
A ,a
HP?
C ).
In addition, the MDRA can communicate with the HA and the RC to get their opinion about a certain agent, to use in the
MDRA’s reliability calculation process. Also, the MDRA maintains dynamic opinions about the HA and the RC (arrows 3
and 5 in Figure 3) that are calculated based on opinion comparison [11].
5 MDRA Protocol
Section 4 introduced the components needed to implement our reliability model. In this section we define the protocol
whereby these components interact with one another.
The Medical Data Reliability Assessment (MDRA) service is a supporting service for an Electronic Health Record (EHR)
system. It is responsible for assessing the reliability of given medical data and then communicating this information to
the EHR system to update the medical metadata displayed. This process starts by receiving medical data from the
EHR system, then the MDRA starts its investigation by consulting the EHR reputation system and seeks, if necessary,
opinions from known parties. In this setup, we assume that each entity, including healthcare providers, medical practi-
tioners, the Healthcare Authority, and the Reputation Centre has a well-defined identity that can be verified in a secure
context.
To better understand the functionality of the MDRA service, we use the following steps to depict the messages received
and sent by the MDRA service in order to accomplish its task (Figure 4).
1. Healthcare provider HP’s EHR system receives medical data for patient p from healthcare provider HP2.
2. The EHR system sends this medical data to the MDRA service to evaluate its reliability.
3. The MDRA extracts medical metadata to identify the source healthcare provider src, who is HP2 in this case,
and the identity of the medical practitioner mp who created this record.
4. The MDRA accesses the EHR reputation database to find historical interaction experiences between HP and
src, and HP and mp.
5. If the recorded experiences do not satisfy HP’s confidence criteria (see Section 6) then:
(a) The MDRA requests opinions about src and mp from Healthcare Authority HA.
(b) The MDRA requests opinions about src and mp from Reputation Centre RC.
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Figure 4: Medical data reliability evaluation message sequencing
6. The MDRA service uses the received information to calculate the medical data reliability score.
7. The MDRA service sends the result back to the EHR system.
8. The EHR system updates the medical data displayed to reflect the computed reliability score, e.g. by highlighting
potentially unreliable data.
6 Measuring the Reliability of Medical Data
Assume a healthcare provider HP has received medical data about a specific patient. This medical data consists of
medical data fields, and each field MF has attached metadata. This metadata provides information about the identity of
the healthcare provider src who produced the data, and of the medical practitioner mp who diagnosed the patient and
authorised entry of this data into the patient’s medical record. In order to evaluate the reliability ϕHPMF of a given medical
data field, HP’s MDRA service conducts a trust assessment for those agents responsible for producing each data field
MF . This process starts by evaluating healthcare provider HP’s opinion ωHPsrc of the source healthcare provider src, and
HP’s opinion ωHPmp of medical practitioner mp. Afterwards, the MDRA uses this information to compute the reliability of
the medical data by using the fusion operator as in the following equation.
ϕHPMF = E(ω
HP
src ⊕ωHPmp ) (11)
The Electronic Health Record (EHR) system uses the resulting reliability score ϕHPMF to update medical data field MF ’s
metadata to reflect this score in order to alert the medical practitioner relying on the data if its reliability is low.
In order to compute the reliability of medical data field MF , the MDRA needs to evaluate the trustworthiness of its
sources src and mp. However, the MDRA’s approach for calculating these values is similar; therefore we will denote the
trust target as agent X which represents either src or mp. The MDRA follows two approaches in calculating the trust of
a given agent X and this approach is determined by evaluating certain criteria which we call the confidence criteria. In
our system, we define the confidence criteria as the number of interaction experiences n had with agent X in a period
of time t. Based on these criteria, the MDRA will use its internal assessment service (Section 6.1) if HP’s interaction
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experiences with agent X within time period t are greater than or equal to n, otherwise it will use an external assessment
service (Section 6.2) from which it will seek the healthcare authority and reputation centre’s opinions about X .
6.1 Internal Assessment
The Medical Data Reliability Assessment service uses healthcare provider HP’s reputation database to derive HP’s
opinion ωHP?X about agent X . Provider HP’s opinion parameters are calculated as follows:
bHPX =
rHPX
(rHPX + s
HP
X +2)
dHPX =
sHPX
(rHPX + s
HP
X +2)
uHPX =
2
(rHPX + s
HP
X +2)
aHPC = HP’s base rate for agent X ’s community C
(12)
The base rate in Eq. 12 helps the healthcare authority to set a priori trust about a certain agent in the absence of any
interaction experiences. On start-up of the reputation system this value is usually set by the authority who provides the
reputation system.
Most previous work treats the base rate as a static value that does not change over time. However, this is inadequate
for our purposes because the base rate should reflect the evaluator’s belief at a certain time towards its targeted
community. Therefore, we use healthcare provider HP’s base rate for agent X ’s community (the relevant healthcare
provider’s or medical practitioner’s community base rate) to represent the base rate in HP’s opinion. In order to calculate
the community base rate, the MDRA aggregates the community’s reputation values at time t.
rHPC,t = ∑M∈C r
HP
M
sHPC,t = ∑M∈C s
HP
M
(13)
Afterwards, we define the community base rate at time t +1 as the community’s reputation score at time t.
aHPX ,(t+1) =
rHPC,t + r0
rHPC,t + s
HP
C,t + r0+ s0
where

X ∈C
r0 =WaHPC,t
s0 =W
(
1−aHPC,t
) (14)
Here r0 and s0 represent the a priori reputation of community C. They are expressed as a non-informative constant
weight W that is distributed over all possible outcomes as a function of the base rate.
Once the MDRA has computed HP’s opinion about X and HP’s experiences with X satisfy the confidence criteria, the
MDRA publishes HP’s opinion about X as follows.
ωHPX = ω
HP?
X (15)
Once the MDRA finishes computing HA’s opinions about src and mp, it substitutes these values into Eq. 11 to derive
HP’s subjective reliability measure ϕHPMF on the medical data.
6.2 External Assessment
In this approach, healthcare provider HP seeks opinions from external parties to be combined with HP’s self-computed
opinion ωHP?X in order to derive HP’s overall opinion ωHPX about agent X . There are two sources of information: relevant
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Healthcare Authority HA and Reputation Centre RC. Each source sends its opinion about X to HP through a secure
communications channel. However, these opinions are discounted by HP’s opinion about each source. The following
equation uses the Subjective Logic fusion operator to compute HP’s opinion about X using HP’s self-computed opinion,
HA’s opinion, and RC’s opinion about X .
ωHPX = ωHP
?
X ⊕ωHP:RCX ⊕ωHP:HAX (16)
The computation process for discounted opinions ωHP:RCX and ωHP:HAX is the same. Therefore, in the following, we show
how to compute ωHP:RCX , and the same process can be applied to produce ωHP:HAX .
Firstly, the MDRA needs to compute HP’s opinion about RC, so the MDRA uses an opinion comparison approach
via the operator “↓” [11], which here is HP’s distrust of RC, proportional to the greatest difference in point estimates
between HP and RC opinions about certain agent. The MDRA selects an agent Z from HP’s database, calculates HP’s
opinion ωHP?Z about Z, and compares it to RC’s opinion ωRCZ about Z. The following equation shows how HP’s opinion
about RC is computed.
ωHPRC = ω
HP
Z ↓ ωRCZ where

dHPRC =
∣∣∣( rHPZ +1rHPZ +sHPZ +2)− ε(~RRCZ )∣∣∣
uHPRC = max
[
uHPZ ,u
RC
Z
]
bHPRC = 1−bHPRC −uHPRC
(17)
Secondly, the Reputation Centre RC needs to convert its multinomial aggregate ratings ~RRCX into a binomial opinion.
Reputation Centre RC uses the following equation to derive the binomial rating parameters r and s.
r = εRCX ∑
k
i=1
~RRCX (xi)
s = ∑ki=1~RRCX (xi)− r
(18)
Afterwards, RC uses Eq. 12 to derive its binomial parameters b, d, and u. The base rate a parameter is computed as in
Eq. 19.
aRCX =
εRCX −bRCX
uRCX
(19)
Finally, the MDRA uses ωHPRC and ωRCX with the transitivity operator to compute the discounted opinion ωHP:RCX as shown
in the following equation.
ωHP:RCX = ω
HP
RC ⊗ωRCX where

bHP:RCX =
(
bHPRC +a
HP
RC u
HP
RC
)
bRCX
dHP:RCX =
(
bHPRC +a
HP
RC u
HP
RC
)
dRCX
uHP:RCX = 1−bHP:RCX −dHP:RCX
aHP:RCX = a
RC
X
(20)
Once the MDRA has computed discounted opinions ωHP:HAX and ωHP:RCX , it uses these values in Eq. 16 to derive HP’s
opinion about X , which is either healthcare provider src or medical practitioner mp. Finally, the MDRA substitutes HP’s
computed opinion ωHPsrc of src and ωHPmp of mp into Eq. 11 to derive HP’s subjective reliability measure ϕHPMF of medical
data field MF .
7 Motivational Scenario Revisited
In this section we revisit the motivational scenario from Section 1 to see how our Medical Data Reliability Assessment
(MDRA) service would alert medical practitioner Frank to Tony’s unreliable medical data. Assume that each system,
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(a) HA’s Reputation System
Agent ~R ~a
Tony (T ) (3,5,4,2,0) (0.002,0.006,0.008,0.01,0.974)
Medical Centre (MC) (1,2,2,5,0) (0.002,0.004,0.008,0.01,0.976)
Karen (K) (0,0,0,1,0) (0.002,0.006,0.008,0.01,0.974)
(b) HP’s Reputation System
Agent r s
Tony (T ) 0 1
Medical Centre (MC) 2 3
Karen (K) 6 1
(c) RC’s Reputation System
Agent ~R ~a
Tony (T ) (7,4,2,3,1) (0.1,0.2,0.3,0.2,0.2)
Medical Centre (MC) (3,2,2,6,2) (0.1,0.2,0.2,0.3,0.2)
Karen (K) (0,0,3,4,3) (0.1,0.2,0.3,0.2,0.2)
Table 1: Reputation scores for the motivational scenario
including healthcare provider Frank’s medical system HP, the nationwide healthcare authority HA, and the government-
run reputation centre RC, has reputation scores about Tony and his healthcare centre as shown in Table 1. Authority
HA’s reputation system maintains rating vector ~R (Table 1(a)) that has five elements, four represent severity rating levels
(extreme, high, medium, low) and the fifth element represents the well behaviour, the base rate vector ~a represents the
priori base rate for those elements in ~R. Healthcare Provider HP’s reputation system (Table 1(b)) has two values,
positive observations r and negative observations s. Reputation centre RC maintains ratings vector ~R (Table 1(c))
which has five rating levels (bad, mediocre, average, good, excellent), the base rate ~a represents the a priori base rate
for elements in ~R.
When Frank requests Sara’s EHR, his medical system will evaluate the reliability of each data field. Here we show
how the MDRA will evaluate the reliability of Tony’s medical data. The MDRA starts by checking its reputation system,
where there are insufficient experience entries recorded either with Tony or his medical centre. Therefore, the MDRA
requests HA’s and RC’s opinion about Tony and his medical centre. Healthcare authority HA uses its point values
~m = (0,0.2,0.43,0.67,1) with ~S , which is computed using Eq. 4, in Eq. 10 to produce its reputation scores εHAT and
εHAMC. Then HA uses Eqs. 18, 12 and 19 to compute its binomial opinions ωHAT = (0.33,0.55,0.13,0.38) and ωHAMC =
(0.49,0.33,0.18,0.6). Afterwards, the MDRA uses Eq. 17 to compute its opinion about HA, with Karen as the subject of
this process. The resulting opinion ωHPHA = (0.23,0.1,0.67,0.8), where the base rate trust has been set to aHPHA = 0.8, is
used with each of ωHAT and ωHAMC in Eq. 20 to compute the MDRA’s discounted opinion that HA holds about Tony, which
is ωHP:HAT = (0.25,0.42,0.33,0.33), and about Tony’s healthcare centre which is ωHP:HAMC = (0.37,0.25,0.38,0.6).
The MDRA follows the previous approach to compute its discounted opinion held by RC about Tony and his medical cen-
tre. However, the only difference in this process is the way that RC computes its reputation score. Since RC’s rating lev-
els are evenly distributed, it uses Eq. 6 to compute its reputation score ε . As a result, the MDRA’s discounted opinion for
RC about Tony is ωHP:RCT = (0.28,0.55,0.17,0.33) and about Tony’s medical centre is ωHP:RCMC = (0.52,0.4,0.09,0.65).
Next, the MDRA substitutes its internal opinions: ωHP?T = (0, .033,0.67,0.29,0.5) and ωHP?MC = (0.29,0.43,0.29,0.5),
and its calculated discounted opinions into Eq. 16 to compute HP’s opinion about Tony and his medical centre which is
ωHPT = (0.24,0.55,0.12,0.17) and ωHPMC = (0.48,0.39,0.06,0.62).
Finally, the MDRA computes HP’s reliability measure ϕ about Tony’s medical entry by substituting ωHPT and ωHPMC into
Eq. 11 which results in ϕ = 0.018 which implies that the medical data is unreliable.
The MDRA communicates this result to the EHR system, which then updates the medical metadata for the fields
derived from Tony’s diagnosis to indicate their low reliability. Now GP Frank will notice the highlighted medical data,
which implies that this information is unreliable, and will reinvestigate the case again which will result in discovering the
skin cancer in an earlier stage.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) system overcomes the problems and limitations that are associated with paper
based systems and isolated Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems; however, it is hindered by several ‘soft’ security
problems such as concerns over privacy and reliability (trust). Medical data reliability is a crucial requirement that can
affect a medical practitioner’s decisions when using historical medical data. In the current situation, all historical medical
data are trusted equally; however, this should not be the case.
In this paper, we presented a Medical Data Reliability Assessment (MDRA) model that can augment an EHR with
metadata containing a reliability measure of medical data. In this process, several reputation systems have been
used together with a subjective logic trust analysis to produce a reliability measure. The MDRA can communicate this
reliability score to the EHR displayed on the medical practitioner’s computer to alert the medical practitioner to any
reliability concerns.
In future work we will demonstrate this model by implementing it in a workflow system, based on the YAWL (www.yawl-
system.com) workflow system, so that the displayed data responds to each reliability assessment request that comes
from any healthcare business process. Also, we will use the extended attributes implemented in YAWL to reflect the
calculated reliability score of given medical data.
In this paper, we assumed that the healthcare authority (HA) maintains a ratings vector about healthcare agents,
but we did not discuss how the HA treats previously investigated and dismissed cases of medical misconduct in its
ratings calculation. Therefore, in future work we will develop an appropriate healthcare-oriented time-variant processing
mechanism which will allow the HA to produce ratings scores which exonerated medical practitioners to recover their
reputation.
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